A-Bomb & The Cold War

The use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is a topic that has been debated for decades and remains a subject of controversy. A key issue that has been brought up by multiple historians is that the bomb was mainly directed towards the Soviet Union and was a major cause of the Cold War.

Some historians argue that the use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had less to do with Japan and more about its use as a diplomatic tool against the USSR. “Stimson [the Secretary of War] had a virtual obsession with the matter” (The Most Controversial Decision) and Groves, the army general in charge of the Manhattan project, further describes how the bomb was made on “the premise that the USSR is our enemy” and was to be used as an “advantage” when dealing with them (Hiroshima). The fact that two key people in charge of building the bomb both saw it as a tool to be used with the USSR indicates that the bomb was indeed a diplomatic device.

This is further solidified by the fact that the US delayed the Potsdam Conference for two weeks in order to wait for Trinity, the first successful detonation of a nuke (Prompt and Utter Destruction). He did this in attempt to “defer consideration of major issues with Soviets until he had the weapon to impute coherence to his foreign policy.” Truman also developed a new attitude of confrontation during the meetings as he had “an atomic bomb up his sleeve” (Takaki). Alperovitz further argues that when the bomb was dropped it was done to prevent Soviet expansionism and make, as Takaki describes, the USSR “more manageable.”

On the contrary, many believed that the bomb was not used as a diplomatic tool. Hiroshima describes how the US wanted international control of nukes and the ability to cooperate with the USSR based on “quid pro quo”. Essentially, if the US was not trying to keep a monopoly over nuclear weapons and was actively working with the Soviet Union regarding nuclear power, it is unlikely that he would try to use it as a diplomatic tool to pressure the Soviets. The Most Controversial Decision further describes how Truman had “no intention to engage in atomic diplomacy”, and did not focus on the geopolitical considerations of having the bomb, as he was “unwilling to build his foreign policy upon the potential of an untested weapon.” Prompt and Utter Destruction strongly supports this through its description of how Truman and his staff “never used diplomatic advantage in a deliberate way.”

Something that cannot be debated; however, is the fact that the A-bomb led to the nuclear arms race between the US and the USSR. Immediately after Potsdam, Stalin went to his advisors and said "we need to get Kurchatov working faster on this" (referring to the Soviet a-bomb development). Stalin saw U.S. possession of the atomic bomb as a direct threat to the Soviet Union and he was determined to level the playing field. Additionally, through atomic espionage, Soviet scientists were well on their way to developing their own bomb.

The Soviets also refused to cooperate with the US designated by their rejection of the Baruch Plan (1946), during the first meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC), which called for the Soviets to share every detail of their atomic energy program; including opening their facilities to international inspectors. By August 1949, the Soviets had successfully tested their own nuclear device and the nuclear arms race that would define the rest of the Cold War was on.